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Article
The Effect of Dislike on Accuracy and Bias
in Person Perception
Johannes Zimmermann1, Simon Schindler2, Geraldine Klaus2,
and Daniel Leising3
Abstract
The present work explores how accuracy and bias in person perception change with the level of liking that the perceiver holds
toward the target person. Specifically, we studied whether dislike affects (a) the social desirability of judgments (positivity bias), (b)
the extent to which the target is described like an average person (normative accuracy), and (c) the extent to which the judgment
reflects the given target’s characteristics in particular (distinctive accuracy). Eighty-four participants watched four target persons
on video, after receiving bogus feedback on how positively or negatively those targets had supposedly evaluated them. The
participants reciprocated negative bogus evaluations showing a marked decrease in reported liking for the respective target. Most
important, dislike was consistently associated with lower positivity bias, greater normative accuracy, and lower distinctive
accuracy across two validation measures (i.e., self-reports and informant reports of target persons).
Keywords
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Judging people’s personalities is a fundamental part of every-
day life. For example, we think and talk about what kind of per-
son someone is after meeting that person at a party, hearing
gossip about colleagues, or watching presidential candidates
in public debates. Judging people’s personalities also is a part
of daily business in professions such as personnel management
and psychotherapy. In many instances, person judgments have
profound consequences for the target persons and/or the people
around them. For example, person judgments in everyday life
may determine whether others want to continue having a rela-
tionship with a person, and person judgments in professional
contexts may lead to treatment (e.g., therapy) and/or sanctions
(e.g., imprisonment). Thus, the question of whether—and
under what circumstances—person judgments are accurate is
very important (Funder, 1995). In the present article, we use
an experimental procedure to investigate whether judgmental
accuracy is influenced by the perceiver’s affective attitude
toward the target person—that is, by how much the person
making the judgment likes the person he or she judges.
The accuracy of a judgment is usually defined as the level of
agreement between that judgment and some other variable that
is considered to reflect “the truth.” For example, people may
guess each other’s body weight and then their judgments may
be compared with the targets’ actual body weights, as measured
by a scale. In person perception research, however, the situa-
tion is more complicated, mostly because a single universally
accepted method to assess a person’s “true” personality is not
available (Funder, 1995). As a solution to this problem, it has
been suggested to consider different methods simultaneously
including self-reports and informant reports (Vazire, 2010).
Each of these methods has its own strengths and weaknesses:
For example, whereas target persons themselves have access
to much more information compared to people from the social
environment (e.g., their own behavior in different situations,
their own inner thoughts and feelings, etc.), they are also more
susceptible to self-serving or self-denigrating biases and pro-
vide only a single judgment that does not permit averaging out
systematic judgment error (Hofstee, 1994). In the present
study, we use two different methods to measure targets’ true
personalities: (a) ratings by the targets themselves and (b) aver-
aged ratings by target-nominated informants who know the tar-
get well. This allows us to test whether the potential effects of
liking on judgmental accuracy generalize across different vali-
dation measures.
In the present article, we study judgmental accuracy in terms
of the “profile agreement” between ratings of a target by a per-
ceiver on a set of items, and another profile that is thought to
contain the true standings of the target on these items (as
defined by one of our two validation measures). Profile
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analyses enable us to simultaneously investigate how accuracy
is influenced by factors differing between perceivers, targets,
and perceiver–target dyads (Biesanz, 2010; Borkenau &
Leising, 2016). When studying accuracy in terms of profile
agreement, two different types of accuracy must be distin-
guished (Biesanz, 2010; Furr, 2008). First, normative accuracy
is the extent to which a judgment (of a target, by a perceiver,
across many traits) reflects differences in base rates between
traits: People tend to attribute higher levels of some traits
(e.g., “reliable” as compared to “deceitful”) to targets on aver-
age, and these differences are reflected by most person judg-
ments. Second, distinctive accuracy is the extent to which a
judgment reflects the characteristics that set the current target
apart from the average target. For example, let us assume that
Paula describes Trudy as being very (5) smart, rather (4) asser-
tive, and not at all (1) malicious. This profile can be predicted
from two kinds of validation profiles: First, a (normative) vali-
dation profile containing the values of the average target on the
same three traits, and second, a (distinctive) validation profile
containing the trait levels of Trudy in particular. By using both
predictors simultaneously in regression analysis, one may
determine the unique contributions of each predictor, that is,
normative and distinctive accuracy.
However, an important possible confound needs to be con-
sidered: It has been shown numerous times that averaged rating
profiles tend to be highly socially desirable (e.g., Edwards,
1953). People tend to use positive terms, and not to use nega-
tive terms, when describing themselves and others. As a conse-
quence, when a given profile agrees with an average of many
profiles, this may be the case because the first profile is posi-
tive, or because it reflects the average target’s characteristics
very well, or both (Wood & Furr, 2016). The exact strengths
of these two influences are unclear then. Fortunately, separat-
ing the two influences from one another is possible, using a
profile containing the rated social desirabilities of the items
as a third predictor (Rogers & Biesanz, 2015). Thus, in the
present study, we predict a given perceiver’s rating of a target
(on a set of items) from (a) ratings of the same target on a vali-
dation measure, (b) ratings of the average target on the same
validation measure, and (c) ratings of the individual items’
social desirabilities. By simultaneously including these three
predictors, the unique influence of the items’ social desirabil-
ities reflects the positivity bias of the given perceiver in judging
the given target (i.e., the perceiver’s tendency to describe the
target positively or negatively, independent of the target’s
actual characteristics; West & Kenny, 2011).
The aim of the present study is to explore how a perceiver’s
affective attitude toward a target moderates these three influ-
ences on first impressions of targets’ personalities. Whether
we like or dislike someone depends on many factors, such as
shared preferences (Back, Schmukle, & Egloff, 2011), and it
predicts how we perceive the person (Leising, Gallrein, &
Dufner, 2014) as well as how we will interact with the person
in the future (Krause, Back, Egloff, & Schmukle, 2014).
Whether and how the perceiver’s attitude toward the target
uniquely affects accuracy and bias in person perception is
largely unclear, however. For example, will Paula’s view of
Trudy be positively biased and/or more stereotypical when Paula
likes Trudy? And would disliking Trudy reduce Paula’s bias and
maybe even help her recognize Trudy’s unique characteristics
better? These are the core questions we address in the present
article, using an experimental design. By holding all other infor-
mation that the perceivers receive about the targets constant, we
are able to move beyond previous naturalistic studies and control
for a range of possible confounds (e.g., the perceivers’ being
previously exposed to different information about the targets).
Our theoretical reasoning is that holding (moderately) posi-
tive attitudes toward new people constitutes a kind of “default
stance” accompanied by rather automatic impression formation
processes that rely on cognitive shortcuts such as stereotypes
about how most people are in general (cf. Fiske & Neuberg,
1990; Levine, 2014). By adopting (moderately) positive atti-
tudes toward unacquainted others, perceivers may minimize
cognitive efforts while at the same time providing largely cor-
rect judgments of most others’ personalities. In fact, previous
studies found that liking is associated with both greater norma-
tive accuracy (Human & Biesanz, 2011; Human, Sandstrom,
Biesanz, & Dunn, 2013; Leising, Erbs, & Fritz, 2010) and
greater positivity bias (Leising, Scherbaum, Locke, & Zimmer-
mann, 2015) of person judgments. Our study is able to disen-
tangle these two influences, thereby clarifying whether the
assumed automatic impression formation process goes along
with a focus on the average or the ideal target.
In contrast, when perceivers “dislike” a target (e.g., have
reasons not to grant a target the default credit of trust), the
impression formation process may become more deliberate,
focusing more on the characteristics of the specific target at
hand, and relying less on generalized knowledge about the
average target (cf. Biesanz & Human, 2010; Ma-Kellams &
Lerner, 2016). The existing empirical evidence in that regard
is inconclusive yet, however: Tentative findings of one study
suggested that dislike may be associated with increased distinc-
tive accuracy (Leising et al., 2010), whereas two other studies
suggested the opposite pattern (Human et al., 2013; Human &
Biesanz, 2011). In the present study, we experimentally manip-
ulate the initial attitudes that perceivers have toward targets,
intentionally making them less positive. In line with some of
the previous findings, and the reasoning just described, we
hypothesized that this experimental manipulation would reduce
normative accuracy and positivity bias and increase distinctive
accuracy.
Method
We let a group of 84 perceivers judge the same four “standard
targets” from video (i.e., a half-block design; Kenny, 1994).
The experimental manipulation consisted of giving the percei-
vers bogus feedback on how the targets had supposedly evalu-
ated them before. We expected that, when perceivers were told
they had been negatively evaluated by a target, they would reci-
procate that negative evaluation (i.e., like the target less). The
research question of primary interest was how this
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manipulation would affect normative accuracy, distinctive
accuracy, and the positivity bias.
Sample
The total sample of perceivers comprised 92 persons, most
of whom (n ¼ 80) were (nonpsychology) students at a uni-
versity in Germany (see Supplemental Online Material
[SOM] for details on sample size planning). Eight percei-
vers had to be excluded because they failed to show up for
the second assessment session (see below), resulting in 84
complete data sets that were used in the analyses. The mean
age of the perceivers was 23.1 years (SD ¼ 3.52). Fifty-
eight perceivers were female. All perceivers were paid
€15 for their participation.
Experimental Procedure
The study comprised three stages—two lab sessions and an
online assessment in between. The data gathered online are
not relevant to the present study. The first of the two lab
sessions only served to make the cover story believable:
Participants were asked to complete 19 standardized tasks
in the lab, in front of a camera (see SOM for details). They
were told that their behavior in addressing these tasks would
later be evaluated by other participants. In fact, however, no
such evaluations took place. Rather when the participants
returned for the second lab session 2 weeks later, they were
given bogus feedback on how four different persons (the
standard targets) had supposedly evaluated them, and that
it would now be their turn to evaluate the behavior of those
other persons, also from video.
The four standard targets (two women, two men) were the
same for all perceivers. In the videos (ranging from 7 to 10 min
in duration), the targets were shown completing the same 19
tasks that the perceivers themselves had completed during the
first lab session. The standard targets had been selected from a
larger pool (n¼ 14) of participants in a pilot study. We ensured
(a) that they differed substantially from each other in terms of
their individual personality profiles (as assessed by another
group of n ¼ 13 perceivers) but (b) resembled each other in
regard to the overall social desirability of those personality pro-
files as well as their rated likability, attractiveness, and perfor-
mance in the tasks.
We used four experimental conditions to systematically
vary the bogus feedback that the perceivers “received from” the
four targets. Each perceiver was randomly assigned to one of
these conditions. In each condition, the four videos appeared
in a specified order such that each standard target (A, B, C,
D) appeared in the first, the second, the third, and the fourth
position in exactly one of the four conditions. Twenty-one per-
ceivers were assigned to the ABCD condition, 22 perceivers to
BADC, 20 perceivers to CDAB, and 21 perceivers to DCBA.
Before watching and then evaluating the first of the four
videos, the perceivers received the following instruction: “The
person you are about to watch has watched your video and
reported how much he or she liked you on a scale ranging from
1 (not at all) to 10 (very much). He or she used a value of 7.”
The same instruction was repeated before presenting each of
the remaining three videos, only with different liking values:
8 for the second, 3 for the third, and 6 for the fourth video. This
way, each of the four standard targets was paired with each of
the four bogus feedback values equally often.
We were particularly interested in the effect of the third
video (bogus feedback value: 3), as compared to the three other
videos (average bogus feedback value: 7). The bogus feedback
values of the other videos were varied around the value of 7, to
make the experimental procedure more believable (three iden-
tical values might have aroused the perceivers’ suspicion).
Moreover, we used an average value of 7 as the “default” value
(instead of 5.5, which would represent the neutral midpoint of
the liking scale) because previous studies suggest that people
tend to have moderately positive attitudes toward people they
are exposed to for the first time (e.g., Human et al., 2013;
Human & Biesanz, 2011). Based on the norm of reciprocity,
we expected the standard targets’ negative bogus feedback to
be reciprocated by the perceivers (e.g., Gouldner, 1960;
Montoya & Insko, 2008). This was the core experimental
mechanism in the present study.
Directly after watching each of the four videos within
their respective experimental condition, the perceivers
assessed the respective target using a list of 46 person-
descriptive adjectives from the natural language. This list
comprised 30 adjectives assessing the Big Five personality
factors (Goldberg, 1993) and 16 adjectives assessing the
eight octants of the interpersonal circumplex (Wiggins,
1979). The former items were compiled by Borkenau and
Ostendorf (1998); the latter items were selected from the
interpersonal adjective list (Jacobs & Scholl, 2005). The
perceivers used a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5
(very), to judge each of the standard targets in terms of how
well each term described them. The participants were also
asked to report how much they liked the target, using a
scale range from 1 (not at all) to 10 (very). Finally, partici-
pants were thanked and fully debriefed about the study’s
purpose including the bogus feedback.
Validation Measures
We employed two different validation measures: (a) self-
reports and (b) informant reports of the standard targets’ per-
sonalities. All of these ratings were based on the same items
and response format as the ratings by the perceivers in the main
sample. For each validation measure, we performed a separate
statistical analysis, simultaneously predicting the perceivers’
ratings of the standard targets from individual validation pro-
files (i.e., descriptions of the same target on the respective vali-
dation measure), from a normative validation profile (i.e., a
description of the average target on the respective validation
measures), and from the rated social desirability of the items.
The unique contributions of the three predictors (in the order
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in which they are listed here) were our indices of distinctive
and normative accuracy and of positivity bias.
Individual validation profiles. The self-reports and informant
reports were not planned as part of our initial study design.
Rather they were collected roughly 1.5 years later, in line with
recommendations that came up in the course of the review
process for the present article. Self-reports were collected
online by asking the standard targets to judge their own per-
sonality. Moreover, each of the four standard targets was
asked to nominate three knowledgeable informants. These
12 informants provided online ratings of “their” target’s per-
sonality. The informant ratings were averaged separately for
each target. The median profile reliability—as assessed by the
intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC [2, 3]) —was .86
(range ¼ .74–.90), suggesting that the informants sufficiently
agreed with one another in judging the personality profile of
their respective target.
Normative validation profiles. Person judgments tend to contain
normative information, that is, assumptions regarding the dis-
tributions of trait levels in the average target. For each of the
two individual validation profiles, we thus computed a corre-
sponding normative profile capturing the trait-level differences
to be expected for this particular method (see Supplemental
Table S1). We derived the two normative profiles from other
studies that used the same adjectives and the same response
scale but included a much larger number of ratings (Gallrein,
Weßels, Carlson, & Leising, 2016; Leising, Locke, Kurzius,
& Zimmermann, 2016; see SOM for details).
Social Desirability
The social desirability of the 46 items had been judged with
almost perfect reliability (ICC [2, 30]¼ .99) by a separate sam-
ple of 30 raters as part of the Leising, Locke, Kurzius, and Zim-
mermann’s (2016) study. The raters in that study used a scale
ranging from 1 (very negative) to 5 (very positive) to judge the
items’ desirability. As expected, the normative profiles and the
profile of item desirabilities were strongly correlated across
the 46 items, with r(44) ¼ .88 for self-reports and r(44) ¼
.93 for informant reports (see Supplemental Table S2). How-
ever, these correlations were not perfect, suggesting that some
traits were perceived as rather common but undesirable, while
others were perceived as uncommon but desirable. This corro-
borates the assumption that a profile’s normativity and social
desirability are at least partly distinct and need to be investi-
gated separately (Rogers & Biesanz, 2015).
Statistical Analyses
As a first step, we tested whether the experimental manipula-
tion was successful, that is, whether participants liked targets
less when they received negative bogus feedback from them.
We tested this using a multilevel model with random intercepts
and slopes predicting liking from dummy-coded feedback
manipulation—with positive bogus feedback (i.e., a liking
value of 6, 7, or 8) being coded as 0 and negative bogus feed-
back (i.e., a liking value of 3) being coded as 1. If the feedback
manipulation was successful, the fixed effect of the slope
should be statistically significant and negative. Note that from
the perspective of statistical mediation analysis, this effect cor-
responds to “Path a” (i.e., the effect of the independent variable
on the potentially mediating variable; MacKinnon, Fairchild, &
Fritz, 2007).
Next, we extended the social accuracy model (SAM; Bie-
sanz, 2010) to simultaneously test the effect of the feedback
manipulation on distinctive accuracy, normative accuracy, and
the positivity bias in the perceivers’ impressions of the standard
targets. In line with Biesanz (2010), we formalized the SAM as
a multilevel model with crossed random effects. The model can
be expressed algebraically as follows:
Ypti ¼ b0pt þ b1ptIti þ b2ptNi þ b3ptSi þ epti; ð1Þ
where Ypti is perceiver p’s rating of target t on item i, Iti is the
value of item i for the individual target t on the respective
validation measure, Ni is the response to item i that is
expected for the average target on the respective validation
measure, and Si is the rated social desirability of item i. To
improve the estimation and interpretability of coefficients,
we centered all continuous predictors prior to analyses. In par-
ticular, Ni and Si were grand mean centered, and Iti was cen-
tered within items (by subtracting Ni; Biesanz, 2010). Note
that we estimated this model 2 times, each time using another
validation measure (i.e., self-ratings and informant ratings)
for defining Iti and Ni.
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Figure 1. Effects of the feedback manipulation on perceivers’ liking
for the targets.
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The regression coefficients b0pt, b1pt, b2pt, and b3pt may be
expressed as a function of fixed and random effects:
b0pt ¼ b00 þ b01Xpt þ u0p þ u0t þ u0ðptÞ;
b1pt ¼ b10 þ b11Xpt þ u1p þ u1t þ u1ðptÞ;
b2pt ¼ b20 þ b21Xpt þ u2p þ u2t þ u2ðptÞ;
b3pt ¼ b30 þ b31Xpt þ u3p þ u3t þ u3ðptÞ:
ð2Þ
The fixed effects b10, b20, and b30 represent the expected
level of distinctive accuracy, normative accuracy, and positiv-
ity bias, respectively, across perceivers and targets in the pos-
itive feedback condition. The fixed effects b11, b21, and b31
represent the expected change in distinctive accuracy, norma-
tive accuracy, and positivity bias, respectively, that is due to the
feedback manipulation (Xpt). These latter ones are the coeffi-
cients of primary interest in our study and correspond to “Path
c” in statistical mediation analysis (i.e., the total effect of the
independent variable on the criterion variable). The u indices
represent random effects, that is, deviations from the fixed
effects that are specific for perceivers (p), targets (t), and dyads
of perceivers and targets (the latter deviations also include resi-
dual error).
In a final step, we tested whether the level of liking
reported by perceivers predicts distinctive accuracy, nor-
mative accuracy, and positivity bias above and beyond the
experimental manipulation. We tested this by including the
perceivers’ (grand mean centered) level of liking as an
additional predictor in the four equations presented in
Equation 2, yielding additional fixed effects b02, b12, b22,
and b32. From the perspective of statistical mediation anal-
ysis, these effects correspond to “Path b” (i.e., the effect of
the mediating variable on the criterion variable while con-
trolling for the independent variable). In fact, if the experi-
mental manipulation does have the expected negative
effect on the perceivers’ liking for the targets (Path a), a
positive effect of liking while controlling for the effect
of the manipulation (Path b) would indicate that liking
mediates the effect of the feedback manipulation on person
perception.
Table 1. Social Accuracy Model Results for the Self-Reported Validation Measure.
Model I Model II
Parameter Estimate (SE) 95% CI d Estimate (SE) 95% CI d
Fixed effects
Intercept b00 2.865*** (0.026) [2.814, 2.915] 2.858*** (0.026) [2.808, 2.908]
I b10 0.131* (0.062) [0.009, 0.252] 0.131* (0.062) [0.009, 0.253]
N b20 0.312*** (0.079) [0.157, 0.466] 0.313*** (0.080) [0.156, 0.470]
S b30 0.342*** (0.051) [0.241, 0.442] 0.280*** (0.052) [0.179, 0.381]
X b01 0.021 (0.017) [0.054, 0.013] 0.007 (0.021) [0.034, 0.048]
X  I b11 0.053* (0.024) [0.099, 0.006] 0.288 0.054* (0.027) [0.107, 0.001] 0.300
X  N b21 0.239*** (0.048) [0.145, 0.333] 0.759 0.235*** (0.057) [0.123, 0.347] 0.757
X  S b31 0.445*** (0.040) [0.523, 0.366] 1.245 0.198*** (0.042) [0.280, 0.116] 0.665
L b02 0.013* (0.006) [0.001, 0.024]
L  I b12 0.001 (0.007) [0.014, 0.013] 0.012
L  N b22 0.002 (0.015) [0.032, 0.028] 0.023
L  S b32 0.115*** (0.011) [0.093, 0.138] 1.325
Random effects
Perceiver variability
Intercept SD(u0p) 0.130 0.129
I SD(u1p) 0.034 0.031
N SD(u2p) 0.192 0.199
S SD(u3p) 0.209 0.203
Target variability
Intercept SD(u0t) 0.039 0.039
I SD(u1t) 0.121 0.121
N SD(u2t) 0.144 0.145
S SD(u3t) 0.082 0.086
Dyadic variability
Intercept SD(u0(pt)) 0.029 0.000
I SD(u1(pt)) 0.095 0.093
N SD(u2(pt)) 0.130 0.108
S SD(u3(pt)) 0.212 0.133
Residual SD(epti) 0.878 0.878
Note. Estimates are based on 84 perceivers, 4 targets, and 46 items. Correlations between random effects were freely estimated but are omitted in this table.
I ¼ individual validation profile; N ¼ normative validation profile; S ¼ social desirability of items; X ¼ negative feedback manipulation; L ¼ liking; SD ¼ standard
deviation; CI ¼ confidence interval; SE ¼ standard error; d ¼ standardized effect size.
#p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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All models were estimated with restricted maximum likeli-
hood estimation using the package “lme4” (Bates, Ma¨chler,
Bolker, & Walker, 2015) from the statistical environment R
3.3.1 (R Core Team, 2016). We computed p values and 95%
confidence intervals (CIs) for fixed effects based on the Wald
method. In addition, we computed standardized effect sizes (d)
for selected fixed effects. More details including the raw data
and scripts for reproducing the reported results can be found
in the SOM.
Results
The bogus feedback was highly successful in changing the per-
ceivers’ attitudes toward the targets (Path a): While perceivers
said they did like the targets after receiving positive feedback,
b00 ¼ 6.93, 95% CI [6.74, 7.13], that attitude became much
more negative after receiving negative feedback, b10 ¼
2.14, 95% CI [2.51, 1.77], d ¼ 1.09 (see Figure 1).1
Note that the perceivers’ average liking for the standard targets
who allegedly liked them closely approximated the bogus feed-
back value (¼7) that we had used as a kind of “default
response.” In contrast, although the perceivers’ liking for stan-
dard targets who allegedly disliked them was much lower
(¼ 4.79), it was not quite as low as the standard targets’ alleged
liking for them (¼3). So, reciprocity was strong, but not
perfect.
Table 1 presents the results for predicting the perceivers’
impressions of the four standard targets from self-reported vali-
dation profiles and the socially desirable profile: All three pre-
dictors showed a significant and positive influence on the
perceivers’ impressions when the bogus feedback was positive.
That is, we found evidence for distinctive accuracy, normative
accuracy, and positivity bias across perceivers and targets (see
b10, b20, and b30 in the first columns of Table 1). The feedback
manipulation significantly moderated the influences of all three
predictors (Path c): It led to slightly decreased distinctive accu-
racy, moderately increased normative accuracy, and strongly
decreased positivity bias (see b11, b21, and b31 in the first col-
umns of Table 1 and left panel of Figure 2). The follow-up
analysis including liking as an additional predictor suggested
that liking strongly affected positivity bias above and beyond
the feedback manipulation but did not affect distinctive and
normative accuracy (Path b; see b12, b22, and b32 in the last col-
umns of Table 1). Thus, only the decrease in positivity bias was
(partly) mediated by lower liking.
The pattern of results with regard to informant reports was
similar (see Table 2 and the right panel of Figure 2): The feed-
back manipulation led to moderately decreased distinctive
accuracy, moderately increased normative accuracy, and
strongly decreased positivity bias. Again, only the decrease
in positivity bias was (partly) mediated by lower liking.
Discussion
The present study investigated how a perceiver’s attitude
toward a target affects accuracy and bias in forming first
impressions of a target’s personality. Our experimental manip-
ulation was highly successful in reducing the extent to which
perceivers liked the targets and thus can be recommended for
future research along the same lines. Moreover, the effects of
the experimental manipulation as well as of the perceivers’
liking on person perception were highly consistent across
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Figure 2. Effects of the feedback manipulation on bias and accuracy of perceivers’ impressions of the targets’ personality defined by self-reports
(left panel) and informant reports (right panel).
Zimmermann et al. 85
self-reported and informant-reported validation measures.
However, whereas our hypothesis that dislike reduces the posi-
tivity bias was clearly supported, we failed to find the expected
negative effect on normative accuracy and the expected posi-
tive effect on distinctive accuracy.
In fact, our most unambiguous finding was that the negative
bogus feedback led to a strongly reduced positivity bias and
that this effect was at least partly mediated by lower liking.
This is in line with previous studies suggesting that liking is
a strong predictor of how much a perceiver will attribute pos-
itive characteristics, and not attribute negative characteristics,
to a target (Leising et al., 2010, 2015). However, several fea-
tures of the present study make its findings noteworthy: First,
this was a zero-acquaintance study, all perceivers received the
same information about the targets’ behavior (because they all
watched the same videos), and the experimental manipulation
was within target. Thus, the effects of liking that we found may
not be attributed to (a) targets differing in their actual person-
alities or (b) perceivers differing in what information about tar-
gets they were exposed to (except for the bogus feedback).
Second, this was the first study into these issues that used an
experimental attitude manipulation. Due to our research
design, it may be firmly concluded that the formation of affec-
tive attitudes actually preceded the perceivers’ judgments of
the targets’ personalities and not the other way round. Third,
we studied judgments of and by real people, by means of nat-
ural language terms, and based on observations of actual beha-
vior. Thus, our design entails considerably higher ecological
validity as compared to other studies using only hypothetical
or public persons as targets (e.g., Leising et al., 2015). Fourth,
as we controlled for normative accuracy, the experimental
manipulation’s effect on the positivity bias cannot be alterna-
tively explained in terms of (reduced) application of knowledge
about how most people are in general (Rogers & Biesanz,
2015). Thus, our study suggests that liking a person implies
portraying that person in line with an image of an ideal (not
an average!) person, whereas liking a person less may remove
those “rose-colored glasses.” Note that this has consequences
for a broad range of situations in which people judge others’
personalities, including psychological research. For example,
Table 2. Social Accuracy Model Results for the Informant-Reported Validation Measure.
Model I Model II
Parameter Estimate (SE) 95% CI d Estimate (SE) 95% CI d
Fixed effects
Intercept b00 2.843*** (0.022) [2.800, 2.887] 2.837*** (0.022) [2.794, 2.881]
I b10 0.111# (0.058) [0.003, 0.226] 0.114# (0.059) [0.001, 0.228]
N b20 0.256* (0.114) [0.032, 0.479] 0.259* (0.114) [0.035, 0.483]
S b30 0.335*** (0.081) [0.177, 0.494] 0.271*** (0.071) [0.131, 0.411]
X b01 0.019 (0.017) [0.052, 0.013] 0.005 (0.021) [0.037, 0.046]
X  I b11 0.125*** (0.036) [0.194, 0.055] 0.497 0.133** (0.041) [0.214, 0.052] 0.529
X  N b21 0.310*** (0.059) [0.195, 0.426] 0.627 0.297*** (0.072) [0.156, 0.438] 0.596
X  S b31 0.528*** (0.052) [0.629, 0.426] 1.194 0.269*** (0.057) [0.381, 0.158] 0.681
L b02 0.011# (0.006) [0.000, 0.023]
L  I b12 0.006 (0.010) [0.026, 0.014] 0.079
L  N b22 0.008 (0.019) [0.045, 0.030] 0.053
L  S b32 0.122*** (0.015) [0.092, 0.152] 1.053
Random effects
Perceiver variability
Intercept SD(u0p) 0.132 0.130
I SD(u1p) 0.024 0.045
N SD(u2p) 0.257 0.266
S SD(u3p) 0.230 0.249
Target variability
Intercept SD(u0t) 0.029 0.029
I SD(u1t) 0.111 0.110
N SD(u2t) 0.213 0.212
S SD(u3t) 0.145 0.122
Dyadic variability
Intercept SD(u0(pt)) 0.018 0.033
I SD(u1(pt)) 0.185 0.182
N SD(u2(pt)) 0.268 0.265
S SD(u3(pt)) 0.270 0.201
Residual SD(epti) 0.869 0.869
Note. Estimates are based on 84 perceivers, 4 targets, and 46 items. Correlations between random effects were freely estimated but are omitted in this table.
I ¼ individual validation profile; N ¼ normative validation profile; S ¼ social desirability of items; X ¼ negative feedback manipulation; L ¼ liking; SD ¼ standard
deviation; CI ¼ confidence interval; SE ¼ standard error; d ¼ standardized effect size.
#p < .10. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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the average participant in person perception research (e.g.,
informant) will probably like the target to some extent, and thus
profile agreement with other perceivers will be inflated simply
by a shared tendency to see targets positively (cf. Wood & Furr,
2016).
The effects of the negative feedback manipulation on dis-
tinctive and normative accuracy were contrary to our hypoth-
esis and generally not mediated by liking. What seems most
noteworthy is that the negative feedback manipulation led to
reduced distinctive accuracy. Although this finding contra-
dicted our hypothesis that a more negative attitude may
increase attention to, and systematic thinking about, the unique
characteristics of a target’s personality (cf. Biesanz & Human,
2010; Ma-Kellams & Lerner, 2016), it fits well with the results
of two previous studies based on short dyadic interactions
(Human et al., 2013; Human & Biesanz, 2011). One explana-
tion could be that the negative feedback actually reduced the
perceivers’ motivation to attend to and understand the target
person. For example, as the perceivers knew that they would
probably never meet the targets in real life, they may have
reacted with disinterest to targets who allegedly disliked them.
In situations where future interactions with such targets are
possible or even unavoidable, one may expect a different pat-
tern of results (e.g., the increased attention that we hypothe-
sized in the present study). Another explanation could be that
the negative feedback made the perceivers more skeptical
about the self-presentations of the targets. In other words, per-
ceivers may have not “bought” the specific self-images that
targets were trying to convey in the lab tasks (whereas those
self-images are probably reflected both by the targets’ self-
ratings of their own personalities and the ratings by the targets’
acquaintances). In any case, as liking did not mediate the
effects on distinctive accuracy, the underlying mechanism
remains unclear.
Our study has several limitations, which should be
addressed in future investigations. First, although our sample
of perceivers was adequately large, we only included four stan-
dard targets. Moreover, perceivers and targets shared important
sociodemographic features (e.g., age, education, and culture).
Both aspects may have limited generalizability. Second,
although the participants did reciprocate the targets’ alleged
attitudes in direction, they did not do so in extent: Whereas the
standard targets’ bogus feedback was clearly negative (a value
of 3 on a liking scale ranging from 1 to 10), the participants
only responded with slightly negative attitudes (M ¼ 4.79),
on average. As a consequence, we could only compare moder-
ately positive attitudes with slightly negative attitudes in the
present study. Future studies should attempt to experimentally
induce even more negative—or more positive—perceiver atti-
tudes in order to capture the whole range of the liking spectrum.
This seems important because liking may easily have curvi-
linear effects on person perception (e.g., extremely positive
attitudes may reduce distinctive accuracy). Third, our design
was artificial in the sense that there was no possibility of
(future) interactions between perceivers and targets. It may
be the case that dislike has different consequences in real-life
interactions, especially when future contact cannot be avoided.
Fourth, as liking did not mediate the effect of the negative
bogus feedback on accuracy, it seems possible that the feed-
back manipulation may have induced a range of other psycho-
logical processes (e.g., threatened the perceivers’ self-views).
A more extensive experimental research program is needed
to clarify which mechanisms are empirically involved in pro-
ducing effects of dislike on accuracy and bias of person percep-
tion (Bullock, Green, & Ha, 2010).
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Note
1. Perceivers’ gender, targets’ gender, and their interaction did not
significantly affect liking and did not moderate the effect of the
feedback manipulation on liking.
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